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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ladies and Gentlemen, let me begin by thanking the President of Golden 
Gate University, the Dean and Faculty of the law school, and the staff 
members of the Graduate Law Programs office for hosting this 
symposium to honor the memory of a great American and world 
statesman, the late Senator William J. Fulbright. I would also like to 
extend warm and fraternal greetings to Professor Chris Okeke for making 
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it possible for me to be here today. Chris, I salute you and applaud your 
decades of inspiring leadership in legal education and your impressive 
contributions to the progressive development and advancement of 
international law! 
Needless to say, I am honored and privileged to have received the 
invitation from the organizers of the Fulbright symposium. Now that I 
am here, I can honestly say to you that anyone foolish enough to include 
himself in a discussion that probes into the many complex issues that 
confront international law before such a distinguished audience will be 
prudent to keep his voice low and his speech short. I intend to heed my 
own advice. 
My presentation fits into the theme for this year’s symposium, as my 
goal here is to push back the frontiers of contemporary international law 
to find an effective antidote to the problem of indigenous spoliation: the 
organized looting and stashing in foreign banks of the financial 
resources of a State; the arbitrary and systematic deprivation of the 
economic rights of the citizens of a nation by their leaders, elected and 
appointed, in military regimes as well as civilian governments in Africa, 
Asia, Latin America and Europe, on a scale so vast and never before 
seen in history.
This “insidious plague” has contributed, in no small measure, to the 
destruction of the essential foundations of the socio-economic life of 
modern society. Textbook writers have described it variously as 
“embezzlement,” “misappropriation,” “fraudulent enrichment,” and even 
“grand corruption.” However, none of these terms adequately convey the 
full destructive force of this relatively new phenomenon. All they do is 
signify the raw act of taking. What we need is a new concept that 
captures the effect of this unprecedented scale of corruption that leaves 
in its wake the destruction of the social, political, economic, and moral 
foundation of the victim States.  
During my time before you, I shall try to do three things: first, to situate 
the problem of corruption, specifically, indigenous spoliation (I also 
refer to this activity as “patrimonicide” or “state theft”) in its global 
context; second, to identify the basic elements of a crime under positive 
international law in general and in particular crimes that shock the 
conscience of mankind; and third, to demonstrate that indigenous 
spoliation satisfies the basic elements of an international crime. In the 
process, I plan to make the doctrinal case for its inclusion among the core 
group of international law crimes that entail individual criminal 
responsibility. 
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II. INDIGENOUS SPOLIATION IN ITS GLOBAL CONTEXT 
Four outstanding features separate the modern version of corruption from 
its historical antecedents. First, unlike past depredations, where the 
wealth remained in the territory for recycling, the modern context is 
characterized by “great mobility of wealth and the capacity to hide and 
disguise it.” For example, 80-90 percent of the outflows of illicit wealth 
originating from Africa remain outside the Continent. Much of the 
estimated $10-$30 billion fortune of the late President of the Philippines, 
Ferdinand Marcos, was stashed in about 7,270 gold accounts under 
different names in several Swiss banks. Over 100 banks around the world 
were involved in the handling of General Abacha’s stolen wealth, 
including Citigroup, HSBC, BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse, Standard 
Chartered and Deutsche Morgan Grenfell.  You can well imagine the 
difficulty in detecting and tracing the whereabouts of stolen national 
assets. Not surprisingly, therefore, search and recapture efforts have been 
described as a game of hide-and-seek!   
Second, the bulk of stolen national wealth is never reinvested in 
productive enterprises in their countries of origin. These predators prefer 
to invest their stolen wealth in other places, obviously to avoid detection 
and subsequent recovery. 
Third, a feature of the modern version of indigenous spoliation is the 
quantum of assets involved. It is estimated that Africa’s political elite 
hold somewhere between $700 and $800 billion in offshore accounts 
outside the Continent. This amount easily dwarfs the $54 billion World 
Bank aid that flowed to Africa over the past four decades. These private 
portfolios of looted assets stashed abroad are usually very large in 
relation to the total external debts of the countries from which the funds 
were stolen. In some cases, private wealth even exceeds a country’s total 
foreign debt. For instance, capital flight from Sub-Saharan Africa was 
equivalent to 145 percent of the total debt owed by these countries in the 
mid-1990s, or 25 percent of the continent’s Gross Domestic Product! 
General Abacha’s estimated net worth represented between 1.5 and 3.7 
percent of Nigeria’s GDP, while Ferdinand Marcos’ fortune accounted 
for roughly 1.5-4.5 percent of the annual GDP of the Philippines. 
Fourth, those most implicated in the systematic plunder of national 
wealth come from a particular class of people who hold public trust: 
these are heads of state and government, including high ranking public 
officials (elected and appointed) as well as their families and closest 
friends. A few examples will suffice: Chile’s former military strongman 
General Augusto Pinochet, who during his 25 years as head of state 
9
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earned a modest annual salary that never went above $40,000, is alleged 
to have hidden $27 million in overseas accounts under false names. His 
financial adviser would explain the source of this immense fortune as the 
product of shrewd and prudent investing! It is reported that Nigeria’s 
Sani Abacha, upon his death in 1998, left behind a fortune estimated 
anywhere between $2 and $5 billion. We have solid sources that during 
the period he was Head of State, the Central Bank of Nigeria had a 
standing order instruction to transfer $15 million to his Swiss bank 
accounts every day! 
As incredulous as this may sound, the recently ousted Egyptian dictator, 
Hosni Mubarak, may be richer than Bill Gates, founder of Microsoft! 
Reliable sources place the wealth of Mubarak and his family at 
somewhere between $40 and $70 billion. Mexican business tycoon, 
Carlos Slim, reputed to be the world’s richest man, is worth a mere $54 
billion, while Bill Gates’ net worth is about $53 billion. How did a 
former military officer, turned civilian Head of State, whose official 
monthly salary as President, counting benefits, came to 4,750 Egyptian £ 
($808) in 2007 and 2008, amass so much wealth?  
It is against this backdrop of home-grown plunder of the wealth of 
developing countries, by the very public officials vested with a fiduciary 
duty to protect these valuable resources, that one can begin to appreciate 
the question the Roman satirist Juvenal posed as far back as the 6th
century B.C.: “Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodies?” (But who will guard 
the guardians?). Who will protect us from our protectors? Who will hold 
these predators responsible for the systematic pillaging of our national 
wealth? We must look to international law for a solution to this problem.
III. DOCTRINAL FOUNDATION OF CRIMES UNDER POSITIVE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHARACTERISTICS OF AN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIME 
What factors distinguish a crime under international law from an 
ordinary crime? A review of the International Law Commission's 
formulation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the 
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the body charged by the United 
Nations General Assembly with the progressive development and 
codification of international law, the Judgment of the Tribunal, as 
incorporated into the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, the Statutes of the various ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals (Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia, and Sierra Leone), 
and the Rome Statute of the ICC identifies five key elements that 
distinguish an international crime from an ordinary crime.   
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First, the principle of individual criminal responsibility for the 
commission of crimes against the peace and security of mankind has 
been universally recognized as the enduring legacy of the Nuremberg 
Charter and Judgment. Recall that the Nuremberg Tribunal rejected the 
defense’s submission: “…that international law is concerned with the 
actions of sovereign States, and provides no punishment for 
individuals…” Instead, the Tribunal held that international law imposes 
duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon States. The 
principle of individual responsibility and punishment for international 
crimes is widely acknowledged as the cornerstone of international 
criminal law. It was most recently reaffirmed in the Statutes of the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (art. 7 (1) and 
art. 23 (1)) and Rwanda (art. 6 (1) and art. 22 (1)) and in the Rome 
Statute of the ICC (art. 25 (2)). The recognition of the principle of 
individual criminal responsibility has made it possible to prosecute and 
punish individuals for serious violations of international law. 
Second, the principle of punishment is the other half of the doctrine of 
individual responsibility for crimes under international law. Punishment 
is essential as a deterrent against violations of the law of nations. The 
Nuremberg Tribunal set the standard by acknowledging, “crimes against 
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and 
only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the 
provisions of international law be enforced.” Article 3 of the Draft Code 
of Crimes codifies this principle by providing, “an individual who is 
responsible for a [crime under international law] shall be liable to 
punishment. The punishment shall be commensurate with the character 
and gravity of the crime.”1
Third is the principle regarding head of state immunity and defense of 
“obedience to superior orders.” The Nuremberg precedent also 
established: (a) the principle of the supremacy of international law over 
domestic law [Principle II], and (b) the principle of the exclusion of the 
official position of an individual, including a Head of State or other high-
level official, or the mere existence of superior orders, as valid grounds 
for relieving an individual of responsibility for such crimes [Principle 
III]. These principles were incorporated into the Draft Code of Crimes 
art. 1 concluding, “crimes under international law [are] … punishable as 
such whether or not they are punishable under national law;” the non-
applicability of the defense of “obedience of superior orders” – save as 
mitigation of sentence – and the non-applicability of immunities up to 
 1. See also Rome Statute, art. 25 (3)). 
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and including heads of state who commit a crime against the peace and 
security of mankind are covered, respectively, in articles 5 and 7 of the 
code.2
Fourth is the doctrine of universal jurisdiction – or the duty to prosecute 
or extradite. Nuremberg also recognized that certain crimes under 
positive international law should be treated as crimes of universal 
concern, understood as the worst crimes that affect the foundations of 
human society. These crimes have attained jus cogens status (Vienna 
Conv. Art. 53) imposing an obligation erga omnes on all States towards 
the international community as a whole. As a consequence, any State 
may fulfill that obligation of exercising universal jurisdiction over 
persons suspected of committing such crimes, even though the prohibited 
acts were not committed in its territory, were not committed by one of its 
nationals, or were not otherwise within its jurisdiction to prescribe and 
enforce. An obligation erga omnes also confers on any State a duty to 
prosecute or extradite under the aut dedere aut judicare principle.  
Fifth is the principle of the non-applicability of statutory limitations. 
Statutory limitations are not mentioned in the Nuremberg Principles, and 
the Draft Code of Crimes is silent on the matter.3 However, in a bid to 
address the concern that statutes of limitations might forever block the 
possibility of holding the perpetrators of World War II crimes 
accountable, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the 
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations on War 
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in 1968. Article 1 declares,  
[n]o statutory limitation shall apply [to these crimes] … 
irrespective of the date of their commission,” while article 4 
provides that States ratifying the Convention “undertake to 
adopt, in accordance with their respective constitutional 
processes, any legislative or other measures necessary to ensure 
that statutory or other limitations shall not apply to the 
prosecution and punishment of crimes referred to…and that, 
where they exist, such limitations shall be abolished. 
The principle of prescription was eventually included in article 29 of the 
Rome Statute, which provides,  “crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
 2. See also Rome Statute, art. 27, ICTY Statute, art. 7(2)-(4), Rwanda Statute, art. 6(2)-(4). 
 3. Actually, article 7 of the 1991 version of the Draft Code states that “[n]o statutory 
limitation shall apply to crimes against the peace and security of mankind.” However, this language 
was omitted from the 1996 Draft Code out of concern that the non-applicability of statutory 
limitations was a principle which could be applied only to the ‘core crimes’ (such as genocide and 
crimes against humanity) but not all international crimes.  
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Court shall not be subject to any statutes of limitations.” This recognition 
confirms the emergence of a customary international law norm on the 
non-applicability of statute of limitations to crimes against humanity 
among other core crimes in international law. 
IV. THE DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF A CRIME AGAINST 
HUMANITY 
A. EARLY ATTEMPTS AT DEFINING CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
The five factors just discussed are common to all crimes in international 
law. While treaty law recognizes a core group of serious crimes of 
concern to the international community, not all share the same 
characteristics. It is therefore necessary to identify the essential 
characteristics of a crime against humanity, specifically the particular 
features that distinguish this crime from other international crimes, such 
as war crimes or the crime of aggression.  
Three quick comments: First, there has been little agreement for nearly a 
century regarding the key factors that distinguish crimes against 
humanity from ordinary crimes, such as murder, kidnapping, assault, 
rape, and false imprisonment. Early attempts at defining these and other 
crimes in international law, focused more on identifying jurisdictional 
thresholds and not on internationalizing factors distinguishing them from 
ordinary crimes. 
Second, when the Nuremberg Principles re-introduced the concept of 
crimes against humanity, it did so without providing a clear and concise 
definition, other than that they consist of a small group of crimes of 
exceptional gravity that engage individual responsibility.[Principle 
VI(c)]. The Nuremberg Principles defined crimes as punishable for being 
crimes against humanity “when such acts are done or such persecutions 
are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime against 
peace or any war crime.” The link to crimes against peace or war crimes 
as part of the definition of crimes against humanity was omitted in 
subsequent attempts by the ILC to define the scope of this crime. 
Third, the ILC itself has contributed largely to this definitional morass. 
In incorporating the Nuremberg Principles into the Draft Code of 
Crimes, the ILC elected not to draw up a draft article specifying 
particular characteristics of crimes against humanity. As a result, the ILC 
has had to shift gears many times between 1954 – when it issued its first 
Draft Articles on the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind – and 1996 when the final version of the Draft Code 
was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. 
11
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Be that as it may, in the 1991 Draft Code, the ILC introduced the concept 
of systematic or mass violations as crucial ingredients to defining crimes 
against humanity. The concept of “systematic or mass” violations is 
retained in the final version of the Draft Code adopted in 1996 as Article 
18. The article defines crimes against humanity as a congeries of 11 
inhumane acts (see also article 7(1) of the Rome Statute; article 5 of the 
Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal; article 3 of the Statute of the Rwanda 
Tribunal; article 2 of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone; 
and article 5 of the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia). 
Pursuant to Article 18 of the Draft Code, two general conditions must be 
met for a prohibited activity to qualify as a crime against humanity. The 
first condition consists of two alternative requirements: that the 
inhumane acts be committed in (a) a systematic manner, meaning 
pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy and (b) ‘on a large scale,’ 
meaning that the acts be directed against a multiplicity of victims. This 
requirement excludes an isolated inhumane act committed by a 
perpetrator acting on his own initiative. 
A second condition which must be met before a prohibited act rises to 
the level of a crime against humanity within the meaning of Article 18 is 
that the act was instigated or directed by a Government or by any 
organization or group. This alternative is intended to exclude the 
situation in which an individual commits an inhumane act while acting 
on his own initiative pursuant to his own criminal plan in the absence of 
any encouragement or direction from a government, group, or 
organization.  
After a long history of repeatedly changing views, there now appears to 
be an emerging consensus of some of the components of the definition of 
crimes against humanity that distinguish these crimes from ordinary 
crimes. They consist of acts committed (1) as part of (2) a widespread or 
systematic (3) attack (4) against any civilian population and possibly, (5) 
with knowledge of the attack. However, the requirement of “widespread 
or systematic” acts “directed against any civilian population” is 
considered the most widely accepted international element for 
distinguishing crimes against humanity from common law crimes. This 
formulation is retained in numerous international instruments, such as, 
Rome Statute, article 5; Sierra Leone Statute, article 2; and Cambodia 
Extraordinary Chambers Law, article 5.  
The formulation also reflects state practice as evidenced in the decisions 
of leading international criminal tribunals. The jurisprudence of both the 
8
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Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals have weighed in on the first prong, 
‘“widespread or systematic acts,” by adopting an expansive definition of 
“systematic” as referring to the organized nature of the acts…and the 
improbability of their random occurrence.” This jurisprudence also 
makes clear that patterns of crimes, in the sense of the non–accidental 
repetition of similar criminal conduct on a regular basis, are a common 
expression of such systematic occurrence. It remains unclear, however, 
when an act satisfies the widespread part of the requirement. It has been 
suggested that such a determination should be made on the basis of the 
quantum of victims involved and the severity of the damage inflicted. In 
the final analysis, this may not matter that much, because the 
requirement is framed in the disjunctive in article 18 of the Draft Code. 
Though not expressly included in article 5 of the Statute of the 
Yugoslavia Tribunal, the disjunctive approach has nonetheless been 
incorporated in its jurisprudence. 
Understandably, the target of a crime against humanity is the civilian 
population. It is against this group that the seriousness or gravity of the 
crime can be measured. The ICTY Appeals Chambers in Prosecutor v. 
Kunarac et al. has explained, 
The use of the word “population” does not mean that the entire 
population of the geographical entity in which the attack is 
taking place must have been subjected to that attack. It is 
sufficient to show that enough individuals were targeted in the 
course of the attack, or that they were targeted in such a way as 
to satisfy the Chamber that the attack was in fact directed against 
a civilian “population,” rather than against a limited and 
randomly selected number of individuals. 
One would hope that seriousness as the basic concept underlying most of 
these international criminal statutes does not necessarily mean harmful to 
human life in a direct sense, as, say an attack on bodily integrity. Rather, 
an act may be—and has indeed been—characterized as sufficiently grave 
for the purposes of these instruments if its direct effect or its long-term 
repercussions undermine the substantive bases of life in conditions of 
good health as well as individual and collective dignity. Grave and 
severe damage to the socio-economic foundations of any State meets 
these criteria. Although such damage, by definition, does not 
immediately and directly destroy human life, its long-term effects may 
wreak havoc in the most diverse ways.  
12
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V. THE CASE FOR INDIGENOUS SPOLIATION AS A CRIME 
AGAINST HUMANITY 
Ladies and Gentlemen, the building blocks for the inclusion of acts of 
indigenous spoliation as a crime that shocks the conscience of mankind 
are already in place, waiting to be harnessed. I would like to focus on 
three of these:  
 First, it is important to point out that the list of crimes 
recognized in the Draft Code of Crimes, and, in particular, 
those prohibited acts identified as constituting crimes against 
humanity, were never intended to be exhaustive. The ILC 
acknowledged that the enumeration of crimes in the Draft 
Code could subsequently be supplemented by new 
instruments of the same legal nature. This aside, the Statutes 
of the various UN ad hoc criminal tribunals, as well as the 
Draft Code itself, all include in their definition of crimes 
against humanity, a category of “other humane acts” as a 
catchall for acts that cause the same harmful results as the 
acts listed in the main definition. These lists are illustrative, 
but not exclusionary; therefore, the expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius canon of construction will not apply to bar 
the addition of indigenous spoliation as a prohibited act. 
 Second, “extermination,” one of the eleven acts that qualify 
as a crime against humanity (see Draft Code, article 18; 
Rome Statute, article 7(1)(b) and 7(2)(b)) includes in its 
definition, the intentional infliction of conditions of life, 
inter alia, the deprivation of access to food and medicine, 
calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a 
population. The list of enumerated acts under “crimes 
against humanity” can be expanded to include acts of 
indigenous spoliation, which, like extermination, also 
contribute to the destruction of a civilian population. 
 Third, the central test for a crime against humanity is that its 
effects are systematic or widespread and directed against the 
civilian population. Let me pursue this point further. What is 
significantly new about contemporary indigenous spoliation is 
the social and economic devastation that follows when scarce 
capital in billions of dollars is allowed to leave any country, but 
particularly when it leaves a capital-poor developing country. It 
has been empirically demonstrated that the cumulative effect of 
this kind of capital flight on the development of victim States is 
10
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systematic and widespread, and the impact on the civilian 
population is direct as it: 
 Reduces economic growth and discourages foreign direct 
investments because (a) it drives up the cost of capital 
investment, increases business costs and reduces 
profitability;4 and (b) it undermines the performance, 
integrity and effectiveness of the private sector. According to 
an IMF study, distortions generated by corruption result in 
lower investments and economic growth. 
 Decreases and diverts government revenues, as evident in 
the systematic plunder of revenue generating agencies, such 
as tax collection5 and customs. In a given year, for instance, 
of the $135 million in custom duties collected from one 
cash-strapped developing country, only $14 million (about 
10%) was paid into the state treasury; the rest evaporated 
into thin air! With less money for the government budget, 
less money will be available to address pressing societal 
needs. Cameroon’s budget for 2009 stood at $4.6 billion, of 
which $715 million was earmarked for primary and 
secondary education, $226 million for public health, and 
$115 million for the agricultural sector (including fisheries, 
livestock, and the environment). The late President Omar 
Bongo’s deposits in banks in Cyprus, Dubai, France, Greece, 
Switzerland, and the United States alone add up to $280 
million, enough to underwrite Cameroon’s budget allocation 
for public health or a third of the primary and secondary 
education budget!   
 Generates economic distortions in the public sector by 
diverting public investment away from essential sectors, 
such as education and public health, into capital-intensive 
projects where bribes and kickbacks are more plentiful. 
 Misallocates scarce resources. State funds are diverted by a 
small bureaucratic/political oligarchy at the expense of the 
mass of the population. Evidence from across the globe 
confirms that corruption impacts the poor disproportionately. 
A direct consequence of this misallocation of scarce 
  
 4. According to one study, the impact of corruption on foreign direct investment can be equal 
to an extra 20 percent in tax—discouraging investment and reducing profit margins.  
 5. Corruption can reduce tax revenues by as much as 50 percent.  
13
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resources is that the limited funds intended for priority social 
sector spending are shifted to areas that benefit few people. 
Recent investigations by the U.S. Senate on Riggs Bank, one 
of Washington D.C.’s most venerable banks, revealed that 
this institution managed more than 60 accounts and 
Certificates of Deposits (CDs) for an African Government, 
including its officials and their family members, with 
balances and outstanding loans that together approached 
$700 million in 2003. It might interest you to note that the 
President of this country flies in a $30 million presidential 
jet while his unemployed wife maintains a bank credit card 
with a $10,000 daily limit.  Yet in this country 30 percent of 
the population is unemployed; 4 of every 10 children under 
age 5 suffer from malnutrition; for every 1,000 babies born 
in the country 101 die at birth; few ever get to visit a doctor, 
because the country can only boast 125 physicians; and only 
44 percent of the population has access to potable water. 
Government spends less than 2 percent, or a miserly $106 
per capita, of the national budget for health service, one of 
the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
 Renders government regulations ineffective. When in 
return for a substantial bribe, public servants systematically 
evade requirements for public health and protection of the 
environment, the consequences can be quite disastrous for 
peoples’ livelihoods and a country or region’s environment 
and bio-diversity.  
 Breeds impunity and dilutes public integrity. Government 
officials, judges and magistrates who engage in acts of 
corruption wittingly or unwittingly contribute in 
strengthening the hold and influence of criminal and corrupt 
elements in that society. Corruption in the judiciary is fertile 
ground for impunity, uncertainty, and unpredictability for 
those who seek recourse, in particular the poor and the 
disadvantaged.  
 Undermines Democracy and Good Governance. 
Corruption subverts formal processes and rules of conduct 
that are so essential in any democratic system: “[i]t erodes 
the institutional capacity of government as established 
procedures are disregarded, resources are siphoned off, and 
officials are assigned or promoted without regard to 
performance. Corruption in elections usually elects the 
12
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wrong people, those who are parasites and put personal 
greed over national interests. Corruption in legislative bodies 
undermines accountability and representation in policy 
making.” 
 Tramples on fundamental rights and freedoms. A corrupt 
state creates a vicious circle in which the state quickly loses 
its authority and ability to govern for the common good. 
Corruption makes it possible for critics to be silenced, for 
justice to be subverted, and for human rights abuses to go 
unpunished. When corruption reigns, basic human rights and 
liberties are threatened and social and economic contracts 
become unpredictable. It comes as no surprise that countries 
that are high on Transparency International’s Annual 
Corruption Perception Index are the ones where respect for 
human rights is at the lowest.  
 Finally, available evidence also indicates that corruption 
encourages political instability. Corruption in the 
administrative realm “results in the unequal provision of 
services, which undermines the State’s legitimacy and, in 
extreme cases, may render a country ungovernable and lead 
to political instability.” More frightening, stolen national 
funds are often used to buy weapons to fuel domestic 
conflict, and when this happens, the political stability of 
many of these victim States is placed in jeopardy. Such was 
the case in Angola, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and continues 
to be the case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
the Delta region in Nigeria, to name but a few of these 
conflict-prone States. 
Crimes against humanity are inhumane acts that attack not just the 
individual, but by their very nature, humanity itself. These are acts so 
grave, on a scale so large, that their very execution diminishes the human 
race as a whole. As the Trial Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal 
declared in the Erdemovic Case in 1996, crimes against humanity 
[a]re serious acts of violence which harm human beings by 
striking what is most essential to them: their life, liberty, 
physical welfare, health, and/or dignity. They are inhumane acts 
that by their very extent and gravity go beyond the limits 
tolerable to the international community, which must perforce 
demand their punishment. But crimes against humanity also 
transcend the individual because when the individual is 
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assaulted, humanity comes under attack and is negated. It is 
therefore the concept of humanity as victim which essentially 
characterizes [sic] crimes against humanity.  
A crime against humanity is a crime that exposes the barbaric depths to 
which human beings can descend, a crime that evokes moral outrage and 
a crime of such unimaginable horror that it shocks the conscience of 
mankind. Can the same be said for indigenous spoliation? Does this act 
of State theft and its effect on society arouse the same kind of revulsion 
as the Rwanda genocide or the depravity of the Cambodian “killing 
fields?” Arguably “yes,” in degree, perhaps, though not in kind. This can 
be illustrated in the case of a head of State or a government minister who 
diverts for his private use, State resources that are sufficient to retire his 
country’s external debt or to underwrite the cost of basic services to 
millions of his compatriots. Such an act goes beyond the pale of civilized 
conduct and deserves to be recognized for what it is – a crime against 
humanity. Most decent people, I believe, would find such excesses not 
only revolting but, as one commentator was moved to admit, going 
beyond shame and almost beyond imagination. No one can deny that a 
people deprived of such vital life-sustaining financial oxygen, so to 
speak, can survive for long and in dignity. I believe there is reason for 
hope.
A. THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW
Actions taken by the international community in the last decade or so 
reinforce the progressive movement of customary international law 
toward the inclusion of indigenous spoliation among the crimes that 
shock the conscience of mankind. Let’s mention three major 
developments.  
First, international legislation: To combat the growing threat of official 
corruption, the international community has engaged in a spate of 
international law making in the past fifteen years. As a result, we can 
now discern an emerging global consensus wrapped around a number of 
regional and global anti-corruption instruments. The first comprehensive 
regional convention against official corruption was the 1996 Inter-
American Convention against Corruption, followed in 1999 by the 
European Union Criminal Law Convention against Corruption and its 
companion Civil Law Convention against Corruption, then the 2002 
African Union Convention for Preventing and Combating Corruption, 
and finally the 2004 United Nations Convention against Corruption, the 
first global anti-corruption instrument. A cursory review of the 
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preambles of these anti-corruption conventions captures the opprobrium 
the international community attaches to corruption.  
The preambles: 
 Acknowledge that corruption undermines the legitimacy 
of public institutions and strikes at society, moral order 
and justice, as well as at the comprehensive development 
of peoples; 
 Recognize that representative democracy, an essential 
condition for stability, peace and development, requires 
by its nature the combating of every form of corruption 
in the performance of public functions, as well as acts of 
corruption specifically related to such performance; 
Parties to these conventions are persuaded that fighting corruption 
strengthens democratic institutions and prevents distortions in the 
economy, improprieties in public administration and damage to society’s 
moral fiber. They are also concerned with the fact that corruption is often 
a tool used by organized crime for the accomplishment of its purposes 
and recognize that to combat corruption effectively requires coordinated 
action by the international community. 
But, it must be admitted that despite their promises, these anti-corruption 
instruments all fail to define official corruption as a crime under positive 
international law, which engages the responsibility of its authors qua 
individuals. None of the instruments stray from the traditional definition 
of corruption with its narrow focus on bribery involving public officials 
(either bribe-taking or bribe-giving). But even then, the definition of 
bribery embraced in these instruments excludes that class of officials 
who engage in outrageous acts of corruption outside the supply/demand-
side framework. To make matters worse, not all the acts proscribed in 
these conventions are made mandatory on the States parties. Much is left 
to each State party that has not yet done so to enact domestic legislation 
criminalizing acts of corruption as defined in these instruments. These 
shortcomings aside, the few multilateral anti-corruption instruments in 
place represent a major advance in the global war against official 
corruption. 
Second, judicial efforts to make these high-ranking predators account for 
their crimes have also picked up pace in countries around the globe. 
These severe judgments are contributing to subjecting official corruption 
to strict international discipline. 
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Finally, the writings of publicist: An increasing number of highly 
qualified publicists from around the globe also confirm that the 
exceptional nature of indigenous spoliation and its destructive impact on 
modern society support calls for its treatment as a crime under 
international law. 
VI. SOMETHING OF A CONCLUSION 
But for all these initiatives, the international community is still reluctant 
to accord indigenous spoliation the status of a crime in positive 
international law. Why? I think it is because we have been looking in the 
wrong places for answers. I am reminded of an Iranian parable about a 
mullah (a religious leader) who chose to search for the missing key to 
his wardrobe, not in the bedroom, the most probable place to have 
misplaced the key, because it was too dark and he could not see.  Rather, 
this wise man chose to focus his search in the courtyard, the least 
probable place to look for a misplaced wardrobe key, because he could 
see better in the sunlight!  I believe the mullah's predicament is an 
appropriate metaphor for the misdirected energy the international 
community has expended in finding the solution to this seemingly 
intractable problem. 
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